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This article provides a modeling framework for quantifying cost and optimizing
motion plans in combat situations with rapid weapon fire, multiple agents, and
attacker uncertainty characterized by uncertain parameters. Recent developments in
numerical optimal control enable the efficient computation of numerical solutions for
optimization problems with multiple agents, nonlinear dynamics, and a broad class
of objectives. This facilitates the application of more realistic, equipment-based com-
bat models, which track both more realistic models, which track both agent motion
and dynamic equipment capabilities. We present such a framework, along with a
described algorithm for finding numerical solutions, and a numerical example.
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1 I N T R O D U C T I O N
A need that arises in operational planning is to quantify and,
ideally, optimize expected impact or cost in antagonistic situ-
ations. These situations are characterized by multiple, moving
agents, and diverse weapons capacities. Additionally, they are
often characterized by uncertainty—with respect to combat-
ant locations, movements, and weapon capacities. The many
factors involved can create a large problem to model, let alone
optimize, and limited computational resources can force a
compromise between realism and feasibility.
However, developments in computing power and compu-
tational optimal control have expanded computational options
and thus let us reconsider that compromise. Direct numerical
methods, such as pseudospectral computational optimal con-
trol methods (Gong et al., 2006; Gong, Ross, & Fahroo, 2016),
allow us to provide numerical solutions for very general non-
linear control problems with constraints. We are now able to
tackle complex objectives, state and control constraints, and
nonlinear agent dynamics. Furthermore, the pairing of these
methods with efficient nonlinear programming (NLP) solvers
such as lpopt and snopt (Gill, Murray, & Saunders, 2005;
Wächter & Biegler, 2006), lets us optimize over problems
of high dimension—hundreds of thousands of decision vari-
ables. Together these developments enable the assessment and
optimization of detailed, high-dimensional, nonlinear control
problems involving many agents.
Options have also increased for the consideration of uncer-
tainty in motion planning. In practical applications, the states
of antagonistic agents are often uncertain quantities. The
uncertainty in the dynamic opposition faced in operational
scenarios has been modeled in a variety of ways, including
as a diffusion process with stochastic parameters (Hellman,
1972; Mangel, 1981) and Markovian motion (Ohsumi, 1991).
In this article, we consider the problem created when the situ-
ational uncertainty is characterized by parameter uncertainty.
In this case unknowns of the problem are characterized by a
vector of parameters ω contained in some parameter space
Ω ⊂ Rn. These parameters are considered to have uncer-
tain values, with a prior probability density function attached
to them denoted by φ : Ω → R. Recently, multiple algo-
rithms for obtaining numerical solutions to high-dimensional





















































2 WALTON ET AL.
optimal control problems with parameter uncertainty have
been developed. These algorithms address parameter depen-
dent costs (Foraker, 2011; Chung, Polak, Royset, & Sastry,
2011; Phelps, Gong, Royset, Walton, & Kaminer, 2014),
parameter dependent dynamics (Ross, Proulx, Karpenko, &
Gong, 2015; Walton, Phelps, Gong, & Kaminer, 2016), and a
variety of state and control constraints (Walton et al., 2016).
These developments enable the consideration of a multitude
of new optimal control scenarios incorporating parameter
uncertainty.
1.1 Contribution
In this article we present a modeling framework constructed
to capitalize on these new gains in computational optimal con-
trol and provide more realistic cost quantification and more
effective motion plans for rapid-fire combat between multiple
agents. We begin with several classic combat modeling con-
cepts for stationary targets. We then provide ways to modify
and expand on these concepts to build a framework appli-
cable to multiple, moving agents with nonlinear dynamics
that is able to account for variable equipment capabilities,
as well as equipment limitations such as range and point-of-
view (POV) constraints. The resulting problems are nonlinear
and high-dimensional but achievable with the computational
developments referenced above.
The first half of this article focuses on cost quantifica-
tion in antagonistic situations with rapid-fire weapons activity
between agents. We describe the work of Washburn and Kress
(2009), which provides damage quantification for stationary
targets under discrete fire, and Hughes (1995), which provides
a rapid-fire salvo model for stationary agents, and building on
those foundations we present a continuous-time framework
for quantifying damage estimates for moving agents under
rapid fire. Using this framework, we derive a variety of cost
metrics, such as expected aggregate damage over time, and
the probability of inflicting damage over a given threshold.
The second half of this article presents a computational
method for generating numerical solutions, which incorpo-
rates the impact of uncertainty. This article focuses specifi-
cally on situations where uncertainty is characterized by a set
of constant but unknown parameters. The choice of parame-
ter uncertainty is motivated by two considerations. The first
and primary reason is that it is well-suited to capture the par-
ticular nature of the uncertainties often relevant to tactical
situations. In these situations, and in the case of autonomous
vehicles especially, the underlying mechanics of the opposi-
tional forces in question are rarely random. The uncertainty in
their behavior is not driven by stochastic noise, but rather, by
our lack of knowledge about features such as their position,
weapon capabilities, and reaction algorithms. Parameteriza-
tion lets one still take into account a range of ramifications and
risks presented by the different possibilities for these physi-
cal values. The second consideration is the recent progress
in computational methods for optimal control problems with
parameter uncertainty. These methods have progressed from
problem-specific approaches (Foraker, 2011; Chung et al.,
2011), to addressing general cost functions with parameter
dependencies (Phelps et al., 2014), to addressing general cost
and dynamics (Phelps, Royset, & Gong, 2016), and finally to
addressing cost, dynamics, and state and control constraints
(Walton et al., 2016). This provides the practical benefit of the
feasible generation of numerical solutions. We describe the
computational method of Walton et al. (2016) and provide an
example implementation.
The structure of this article is as follows. Section 2
provides a continuous-time framework for quantifying dam-
age estimates. We then elaborate on methods for calibrating
this framework for range and POV constraints. Section 3
presents a class of optimal control problems created by
continuous-time damage estimates and parameter uncertainty,
and describes the method for computation implementation.
Finally, we demonstrate the potential of these methods by
implementing several large-scale simulations, with multiple
controllable units fending off 100 attackers, parameter uncer-
tainty in regards to attackers, interacting spatial dynamics, and
heterogeneous weapon capabilities.
2 Q U A N T I F Y I N G R A P I D - F I R E
C O M B A T
This section presents a model for quantifying rapid-fire com-
bat between multiple agents. This model provides an exten-
sion of the framework of Washburn and Kress (2009), Chapter
2, which provides damage estimates for stationary targets and
discrete fire. In Washburn and Kress (2009), the impact of
discrete, antagonistic weapon fire directed toward an agent is
quantified by using what is termed a damage function. For two
stationary agents with states x ∈ Rnx and y ∈ Rny respectively,
the damage function, D(x, y), returns the probability that target
y is destroyed by a shot fired by x. This quantity is a proba-
bility because the success of any one shot is uncertain, with
success determined by a combination of equipment capabili-
ties and environmental factors. The damage function can be
calibrated, using both experimentation and theory, to reflect
expected equipment performance based on features such as
radial distance or angle.
In the case of moving targets and rapid, ongoing fire, how-
ever, there are additional features which are not captured by
this framework. The first and foremost is dependence on time.
This dependence is found not just in the effects of moving tra-
jectories (where elements such as velocity or acceleration can
impact equipment performance), but also in the importance of





















































WALTON ET AL. 3
duration: the longer a weapon with ongoing fire is focused on
a target, the higher the probability of damage should be. The
second relevant feature is the accumulation of damage—the
attrition of the health of a target caused by multiple, success-
ful “hits” inflicted on the target. Washburn and Kress (2009)
mentions, the “damage function” might be more accurately
named the “kill function,” as it models not the accumulated
damage from multiple inflicted hits, but rather, the probability
of single-shot incapacitation. It may be the case that the prob-
ability of incapacitation is better gauged by metrics such as
the total number of hits, for instance, or “n or more successful
hits.”
For two agents, “x” and “y,” with states at time t ∈ [t1, t2]
given by x(t) ∈ Rnx and y(t) ∈ Rny , let Hx,y(t1, t2) be the
random variable of the number of successful hits by equip-
ment with states x(t) on a target with states y(t) over the
time period [t1, t2] in the absence of other mitigating fac-
tors such as the survival probabilities of agents x and y. The
random variable Hx,y(t1, t2) is based solely on expected equip-
ment performance, and if we assume no equipment changes
from successful hits, then for nonoverlapping intervals [t1, t2]
and [t3, t4], the random variables Hx,y(t1, t2) and Hx,y(t3, t4) are
independent.
Consider the case of fire rapid enough to be modeled as
a continuous barrage. The probability of hitting the target is
determined by two main factors: the rate of successful fire—
the rate of damage—and the time the target spends in the field
of fire. As such, the probability of a successful hit in the time
period [t, t + Δt] can be modeled in the form:
Pr
{
Hx,y(t, t + Δt) = 1
} ≈ d(x(t), y(t))Δt
where d is a function which models the expected rate of dam-
age, calibrated to depend on factors like distance, relative
location, and orientation. Formally, we define the following:
Definition: The damage rate function is a
function d(x(t), y(t)) such that:
i) Pr
{
Hx,y(t, t + Δt) = 1




Hx,y(t, t + Δt) > 1
} = o(Δt).
where the notation f (Δt) = o(Δt) means that
limΔt→0 f (Δt)Δt = 0.
In other words, the damage rate function gives the prob-
ability of the equipment landing a single hit in the time
period [t, t + Δt], and for sufficiently small time periods that
probability is approximately d(x(t), y(t))Δt.
Modeling the efficacy of rapid-acting equipment through
a rate function such as this has a long history in OR, where
sonar and radar performance have been modeled in this fash-
ion since the 1940s (Koopman, 1946; Chapters 2, 5, and 6).
As with successful combat fire, detection through visual input
or through sensor input such as sonar and radar is probabilis-
tic in nature. There is a chance that an object will be detected
when it’s within sensor range, and intuitively that probability
is proportional to the duration of time the sensors are focused
on it. Thus, the probability of a successful detection event
in the time period [t, t + Δt] can be modeled in the form
r(x(t), y(t))Δt, where r(x(t), y(t)) is a rate of detection func-
tion. Since its inception the 1940s, this model for detection
has become widespread in search literature (Foraker, Royset,
& Kaminer, 2016).
Rate-based damage tracking has also been utilized in mod-
eling combat attrition. For large-scale battles between many
units with constant attrition rates, the Lanchester Attrition
model has been applied fruitfully to many situations since
its inception in WWI (Taylor, 1980; Keane, 2011). More
recently, the Hughes Salvo Model has been applied to simu-
late missile battles between ships (Hughes, 1995). The damage
rate function presented above can be interpreted as a nonlin-
ear extension of the salvo model of Hughes (1995), able to
account for movement and resulting heterogeneity in firing
rates and success probabilities.
There are two key challenges in the application of these
principles: the first is utilizing these principles to establish
useful cost metrics; the second designing and calibrating func-
tions which accurately reflect equipment capacities. The next
section will explore these needs in regards to the application
of modeling rapid-fire combat.
2.1 The cost of mutual attrition
There are a variety of possible cost metrics one might wish to
optimize depending situationally on the operational goal. For
instance, one may have as a goal to maximize the expected
inflicted damage to attackers overall, or to prioritize the prob-
ability of destruction of a particular target. Alternately, a goal
may be to minimize overall damage to one’s own defending
units while reaching a destination, or to prioritize the survival
of a particular high-valued unit (HVU).
To quantify damage expectations as mutual fire is
exchanged among agents, one must track both the chang-
ing potential of equipment as agents move relative to each
other and also the effects of inflicted damage on this equip-
ment. This damage may, for example, result in “destroyed”
units–incapacitated units no longer capable of firing with
their equipment. Alternately, cumulative damage may be
accounted for in terms of gradual reductions in equipment per-
formance. The next few segments will construct some useful
metrics for such scenarios when simultaneous, mutual damage
is being exchanged between defenders and attackers.
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F I G U R E 1 Mutual attrition [Color figure can be viewed at
wileyonlinelibrary.com]
2.1.1 Single-shot kill
We first consider the case where successfully hitting an agent
results in incapacitation. For a single defender and attacker,
let defender states at time t ∈ [0, tf ] be given by x(t) ∈ RNx
and attacker states at time t be given by y(t) ∈ RNy . Let
dx(x(t), y(t)) be the damage rate function of the defender
against the attacker and let dy(y(t), x(t)) be the damage rate
function of the attacker against the defender. These respective
damage rates are illustrated in Figure 1.
Let P(t) be the probability that the defender has survived
up to time t and let Q(t) be the probability that the attacker
has survived up to time t. The probability of the defender
getting hit in the time interval [t, t + Δt] is given by the
attacker’s equipment-based damage rate, compounded with
the probability that the attacker survives to emit fire. Thus,
the probability of a single effective hit from the attacker in
[t, t + Δt] is:
Q(t)[dy(y(t), x(t))Δt + o(Δt)] (1)
The probability that the defender continues to survive at time
t + Δt is given by the probability that it has both survived
previously up until time t and garners no addition damage
over [t, t + Δt]. Thus it satisfies the product:












and as Δt → 0 this gives the differential equation:
.
P (t) = −dy(y(t), x(t))P(t)Q(t) (2)
with initial condition P(0) = 1. Similarly,
Q(t + Δt) = Q(t) [1 − P(t)[dx(x(t), y(t))Δt + o(Δt)]
]
and as Δt → 0 this yields:
.
Q (t) = −dx(x(t), y(t))Q(t)P(t), Q(0) = 1. (3)
The probabilities for defender and attacker survivals are
therefore given by the following system of ODEs:
{ .
P (t) = −dy(y(t), x(t))P(t)Q(t)
.
Q (t) = −dx(x(t), y(t))Q(t)P(t)
(4)
with initial values P(0) = Q(0) = 1. The multi-agent
expansion of this is provided at the end of the section.
2.1.2 N-shot kill
One can generalize the approach above to consider the case
where N successful shots are what it takes to ensure suc-
cessful incapacitation. As above, let P(t) be the probability of
defender survival up to time t, and let Q(t) be the probability of
attacker survival up to time t. Additionally, for n = 0, 1, . . . ,
let pn(t) be the probability that the defender is hit exactly n
times by time t, and let qn(t) be the probability that the attacker
is hit exactly n times by time t.
Survival probabilities with N-Shot Kill are defined as the
probability that the number of hits is less than N. Since the
exact number of times an agent is hit is a mutually exclusive
event (an agent is hit zero times, or it is hit exactly once, or it
is hit exactly twice, etc.), the probability of less than N hits is
given by the sum of all the possible exact number of hits less









To evaluate these survival probabilities, it is necessary to cal-
culate the 2N hit probabilities p0(t), p1(t), . . . , pN−1(t), and
q0(t), q1(t), . . . , qN−1(t). Using the methods of the previous
section for the single shot probabilities of Equations (2) and
(3), one can establish:
.p0(t) = −dy(y(t), x(t))p0(t)Q(t) (7)
.q0(t) = −dx(x(t), y(t))q0(t)P(t) (8)
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where dy(y(t), x(t)) is the attacker’s damage rate function
and dx(x(t), y(t)) is the defender’s damage rate function. The
subsequent hit probabilities for higher n can be established
through induction. For n > 0, the probability that an agent has
been hit exactly n times by time t +Δt is given by the sum of
the mutually exclusive ways this can be achieved:
i) The agent has been hit exactly n times in the
previous time interval [0, t] and sustains no
additional hits during [t, t + Δt].
ii) For k = 1, . . . , n, the agent has been hit
exactly n – k times in the previous time inter-
val [0, t] and sustains k additional hits during
[t, t + Δt].
For the defender, the probability of event i) is:
pn(t)[1 − Q(t)[dy(y(t), x(t))Δt + o(Δt)]].
For k = 1, the probability of event ii) is:
pn−1(t)Q(t)[dy(y(t), x(t))Δt + o(Δt)].
For k > 1, the probability of event ii) is:
pn−k(t)Q(t)o(Δt).
Since each of these events is mutually exclusive, the proba-
bility of the defender being hit exactly n times by time t +Δt
is given by the sum:
pn(t + Δt) = pn(t)[1 − Q(t)[dy(y(t), x(t))Δt + o(Δt)]]










dy(y(t), x(t)) + o(Δt)
Δt
�










Due to their nature as probabilities, the functions pn−k(t) and
Q(t) are bounded by zero and one. Thus, they do not prevent
the convergence of the final term to zero as Δt → 0, and as
Δt → 0 this yields:
.pn(t) = −dy(y(t), x(t))[pn(t) − pn−1(t)]Q(t). (9)
Similarly:
.qn(t) = −dx(x(t), y(t))[qn(t) − qn−1(t)]P(t). (10)
The probabilities for defender and attacker survivals can





.p0(t) = −dy(y(t), x(t))p0(t)Q(t)
.p1(t) = −dy(y(t), x(t))[p1(t) − p0(t)]Q(t)
...
.pN−1(t) = −dy(y(t), x(t))[pN−1(t) − pN−2(t)]Q(t)
.q0(t) = −dx(x(t), y(t))q0(t)P(t)
.q1(t) = −dx(x(t), y(t))[q1(t) − q0(t)]P(t)
...
.qN−1(t) = −dx(x(t), y(t))[qN−1(t) − qN−2(t)]P(t)
(11)
with initial conditions given by p0(0) = q0(0) = 1, pn(0) =
qn(0) = 0 for n = 1, . . . , N − 1, and P(t), Q(t) defined as
per Equations (5) and (6). When N = 1 this reduces to the
single-shot survival probabilities from the previous section.
2.1.3 Multi-agent expansions
For the multi-agent case, let K defender states at time t ∈
[0, tf ] be given by xk(t) ∈ RNx,k , k = 1, . . . , K , and L attacker
states at time t be given by yl(t) ∈ RNy,l , l = 1, . . . , L.
Let dk,lx (xk(t), yl(t)) be the damage rate function of the k-th
defender against the l-th attacker and let dl,ky (yl(t), xk(t)) be
the damage rate function of the l-th attacker against the k-
th defender. These respective damage rates are illustrated in
Figure 2. Furthermore, let Pk(t) be the probability that the
k-th defender has survived up to time t, and let Ql(t) be the
probability that the l-th attacker has survived up to time t.
The probability that the l-th attacker is hit exactly one time in
the interval [t, t + Δt] is determined by the probability that
F I G U R E 2 Multi-agent attrition [Color figure can be viewed at
wileyonlinelibrary.com]





















































6 WALTON ET AL.
exactly one defender hits it and all other fails. This probabil-
ity is given by the following sum for the mutually exclusive
probabilities of each defender, respectively, being the one to
successfully hit the l-th attacker:
Pr {yl hit once in [t, t + Δt]}




1 − Pk(t)dk,lx (xk(t), yl(t))Δt
�
+ P2(t)d2,lx (x2(t), yl(t))Δt
K�
k=1,k �=2
× �1 − Pk(t)dk,lx (xk(t), yl(t))Δt
�
+ PK(t)dK ,lx (xK(t), yl(t))Δt
K−1�
k=1
× �1 − Pk(t)dk,lx (xk(t), yl(t))Δt
�
.
Consolidating the higher order terms with respect to o(Δt)
this becomes:




Pk(t)dk,lx (xk(t), yl(t))Δt + o(Δt).
Thus we can see that the cumulative damage rate against the
l-th attacker is given by:
K�
k=1
Pk(t)dk,lx (xk(t), yl(t)). (12)
Similarly one finds that the cumulative damage rate against
the k-th defender is given by:
L�
l=1
Ql(t)dl,ky (yl(t), xk(t)). (13)
Letting pn,k(t) be the probability that the k-th defender has
been hit exactly n times by time t and qn,l(t) be the probability
that the l-attacker has been hit exactly n times by time t, the hit
probabilities are given by the following ODEs derived using
the same methods as Equation (11). For k = 1, . . . , K :
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
.p0,k(t) = −p0,k(t) �Ll=1 dl,ky (yl(t), xk(t))Ql(t)
.p1,k(t) = −[p1,k(t) − p0,k(t)] �Ll=1 dl,ky (yl(t), xk(t))Ql(t)
...
.pN−1,k(t) = −[pN−1,k(t) − pN−2,k(t)] �Ll=1 dl,ky (yl(t),
xk(t))Ql(t)
(14)
and for l = 1, . . . , L:
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
.q0,l(t) = −q0,l(t) �Kk=1 dk,lx (xk(t), yl(t))Pk(t)
.q1,l(t) = −[q1,l(t) − q0,l(t)] �Kk=1 dk,lx (xk(t), yl(t))Pk(t)
...
.qN−1,l(t) = −[qN−1,l(t) − qN−2,l(t)] �Kk=1 dk,lx (xk(t), yl(t))
×Pk(t).
(15)
Notice that these multi-agent expansions assume that the fire
being exchanged between specific agents has been desig-
nated. This implicitly transfers the challenge of allocating or
accounting for divided effort between multiple targets to the
design of the individual damage rate functions rather than
that of the overall survival metrics. A subsequent section
will discuss ways to incorporate divided effort considera-
tions, as well other desired features of accurate damage rate
functions.
2.1.4 Expected damage
When the number of hits it takes to incapacitate an agent
is high, optimizing the probability merely of survival may
be insufficient. It may be highly likely that a given agent
will survive until the end of an encounter, and in such cases
the cumulative damage one can expect to be inflicted can
be a more meaningful metric than the long-shot of agent
destruction. Additionally, tracking this outlier probability
may be expensive given the dimensionality of the system of
ODEs given in Equation (11) for tracking exact hit numbers.
For these reasons, a useful additional metric is the average
expected damage.
For a single defender and a single attacker, let P(t) be the
probability that the defender has survived up to time t and let
Q(t) be the probability that the attacker has survived up to time
t. Let the exact hit probabilities p0(t), p1(t), . . . , pN−1(t), and
q0(t), q1(t), . . . , qN−1(t), respectively satisfy the system of
ODEs given in Equation (11).
Let Hy(t) be the random variable of the number of suc-
cessful hits on attacker y by time t and let the expectation of
this random variable be denoted by Ey(t). By the definition










A solution for Ey(t) can be ascertained by considering its
derivative with respect to t. This derivative is given by
substituting in the values of Equation (11):



























































= −dx(x(t), y(t))P(t)[0 · q0 + 1 · [q1(t) − q0(t)]





Since the quantities qn(t) provide the probability mass func-
tion for Hy(t) and the total probability for all outcomes is 1,
we have
∑∞
n=0 qn(t) = 1. Thus:
.
Ey(t) = dx(x(t), y(t))P(t). (16)
Similarly, one finds:
.
Ex(t) = dy(y(t), x(t))Q(t). (17)
Expected damage can be calculated as the solutions to these
ODEs with initial conditions Ey(0) = 0, Ex(0) = 0. In the
multi-agent case, using the notation from the previous multi-










dl,ky (yl(t), xk(t))Ql(t), k = 1, . . . , K (19)
with initial conditions Ex,k(0) = 0, Ey,l(0) = 0.
2.2 Designing damage rate functions
To model shooting problems, a variety of the specific prop-
erties of the damage rates between agents involved may be
desirable to calibrate. For instance, weapons may be limited in
their effective firing range, and additionally their performance
may be maximized at a certain distance. Another relevant fea-
ture is POV constraints, which limit the angles of effective
fire. It is also important that any model for shooting prob-
lems be able to address the divided effort available per target
in situations where agents are facing multiple targets. In the
methods described in this article, which ultimately use opti-
mal control to provide numerical solutions, another relevant
feature is smoothness—functions which have continuous gra-
dients are desirable to enable numerical performance. This
section will provide some examples of damage rate func-
tions which capture these features. The examples presented
reflect two-dimensional properties, however extensions to
three dimensions are straightforward.
2.2.1 Range limitations
One of the simplest equipment constraints is the limitation
of range. This limit may be in terms of experimentally veri-
fied minimum and maximum equipment ranges, or in terms
of gradual performance decline over distance. One option
from OR literature which is available for adaptation for these
purposes is the Poisson Scan Model (Kim, 2009; Foraker,
2011).
The Poisson Scan Model, developed originally for use in
submarine search, provides an estimate of sonar effectiveness
over distance. For agents “x” and “y” with two-dimensional












the rate function is modeled as:










]2 + [x2(t) − y2(t)
]2 (22)
and Φ is the cumulative normal distribution. The parame-
ters λ, F, a, and σ are equipment specific constants which
can be modified to change the steepness of this function to
be reflect the decline of the rate function over distance. In
the case of a specified maximum range, these parameters can
also be calibrated to create a steep decline which smoothly
approximates this range cutoff (see Figure 3). Benefits of
appropriating this model to model damage rates are that since
it is built on a cumulative distribution, its maximum is straight-
forward (equal to λ), and existing literature (see, e.g., Etter,
2013 Chapter 11; Ainslie, 2010, Chapter 3) on fitting sonar
detection functions may be helpful in calibrating parameters.
One drawback of applying the Poisson Scan Model to the
modeling of damage rates, however, is that the cumulative
normal distribution has an infinite domain. Although it can be
calibrated to approximate finite range limits, enforcing stricter
cutoffs has the tradeoff of steeper gradients, and evaluating
the function only over a finite domain loses the normaliza-
tion properties. A family of functions available for use with
a similar potential for calibration as the Poisson Scan Model
provides but with a finite domain is the family of beta distri-
butions, defined for positive parameters α and β and without
normalization constant by f (z) = zα[1 − z]β. A beta distribu-
tion with parameters α, β ≥ 2 can be extended smoothly (C1)





















































8 WALTON ET AL.
F I G U R E 3 Maximum range limit (left) smoothed using the Poisson Scan Model (right) [Color figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
as a piecewise function:
f (z) =
�
zα[1 − z]β, 0 ≤ z ≤ 1
0, else.
This can be transformed to have arbitrary radius and magni-
tude and can then be centered around an appropriate point.
Specifically, let x(t), y(t), and r(t) be defined as in Equations





, c1 ≤ r(t) ≤ c2
0, else
(23)





. Equation (23) provides a damage
rate with starting range c1, end range c2, and maximum rate λ.
To model equipment with monotonically decreasing perfor-
mance with increasing r(t), as the Poisson Scan Model does,

















cα+β. Equation (24) provides a damage rate
with its peak at r(t) = 0, end range c, and maximum rate λ.
Figures 4 and 5 provide illustrations of this approach.
2.2.2 POV constraints
In addition to modeling different radii and peaks of effec-
tiveness, smooth attrition rate functions can be created which
F I G U R E 4 Example damage rate using the transformed beta
distribution of Equation 23 [Color figure can be viewed at
wileyonlinelibrary.com]
F I G U R E 5 Example damage rate using the transformed beta
distribution of Equation 24 [Color figure can be viewed at
wileyonlinelibrary.com]
model POV constraints. This can be accomplished by includ-
ing a multiplier with domain [−π, π] which decreases as the
magnitude of the relative angle between agents increases.
Figures 6 and 7 demonstrate the application of an angular
multiplier to a limited range damage function.
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F I G U R E 6 Effect of an angularly decaying multiplier on an
example attrition rate function [Color figure can be viewed at
wileyonlinelibrary.com]
2.2.3 Divided effort
The issue of divided firing effort is critical to account for in
multi-agents scenarios. Although one straightforward method
is to assign the focus of each agent on a specific target, this
is unnecessarily limiting, especially in situations with high
numbers of agents. One goal of this framework is to be able
to generate optimal plans for analysis, without assuming such
distinct planning compromises beforehand. As such, we prefer
to model divided effort as a continuously shifting focus which
divides damage proportionally between “nearby” targets.
To retain the smoothness necessary to implement the com-
putational framework described subsequently, we approx-
imate the region of “nearby” using a smoothed indicator
function, similar in approach to Figure 3. For example, for
K defenders and L attackers, let xk(t) be the location of the k-
th defender, yl(t) the location of the l-th attacker, and rk,l(t) is
the distance between them as per Equation (22). The number
of attackers within a radius ρ of defender xk at time t can be
F I G U R E 7 Resulting angularly decaying function reflecting POV
limitations [Color figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]





for ρ = 0.5
and σ = .2, .1, .05 [Color figure can be viewed at
wileyonlinelibrary.com]
estimated by the sum:









where Φ is a cumulative normal distribution. It is assumed
that the radius ρ is aligned with equipment ranges such that all
targets within range of fire are considered. Figure 8 provides
several instances of this smooth estimator for values of ρ andσ.
The defender’s base damage function can be distributed
by applying a multiplicative factor based on this smooth esti-
mator. For instance, one can consider the divided effort factor




N (rk,1, . . . , rk,L) ≥ 1.
2 − N (rk,1, . . . , rk,L) N (rk,1, . . . , rk,L) < 1.
Figure 9 illustrates this divided effort function. This function
divides fire by the approximate number of attackers within
range when that number is greater than or equal to 1. When
no attackers are within range, the linear segment maintains
continuous differentiability while capping growth of the fac-
tor. In this latter segment, the defender’s base damage rate
F I G U R E 9 Example divided effort multiplicative factor [Color
figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]





















































10 WALTON ET AL.
function should be near zero due to out-of-range targets and
thus the low-valued divided effort factor is inconsequential.
Attacker damage rates can be similarly distributed by the sum
over all defenders.
3 C O M P U T A T I O N A L
F R A M E W O R K
The conditioning of attacker trajectories on uncertain parame-
ter, ω, leads to performance metric which are also conditional
on ω. A natural performance measure is to minimize the
expectation of this conditioned random variable over the





F(z(T , ω), ω) +
∫ T
0
r(z(t, ω), u(t), t, ω)dt
]
φ(ω)dω
in which the existence of uncertain parameters in the problem
has presented itself through a (potentially high dimensional)
integration over a parameter space. The expression inside the
integral:
F(z(T , ω), ω) +
∫ T
0
r(z(t, ω), u(t), t, ω)dt
is a Mayer-Bolza form cost function, which allows for the con-
sideration of an end time cost F(z(T , ω), ω) and a running cost∫ T
0 r(z(t, ω), u(t), t, ω)dt. Examples include minimizing the
final time probability of a defensive unit’s destruction, given
for instance by attrition Equation (2) in Section 2; or minimiz-
ing aggregate fuel expenditure in the form of a running cost.
The vector of states z(t, ω) can encompass the agent trajecto-
ries dependent on parameter ω, which may be proscribed as
functions or as solutions to ODEs, and also relevant hit and
survival probabilities (now also conditioned on ω) given by
the ODEs of Section 2.
We thus consider the optimization of combat trajectories
given parameter uncertainty as an instance of the following
class of optimal control problems:
Problem P: Given probability density function φ : Ω →






F(z(T , ω), ω) +
∫ T
0
r(z(t, ω), u(t), t, ω)dt
]
φ(ω)dω
subject to the dynamics:
dz
dt
(t, ω) = f (z(t, ω), u(t), ω)
with initial condition z(0, ω) = z0(ω) and control constraint
g(u(t)) ≤ 0, ∀t ∈ [0, T ].
This is a nonstandard optimal control problem due to
the integration over parameter space and the dependence of
state dynamics on these parameters. In recent years, mul-
tiple methods and associated convergence properties have
been established for optimal control problems with param-
eter dependencies. Computational approaches include the use
of multi-dimensional pseudospectral methods (Ruths & Li,
2012), sample-based approximation (Phelps, Royset, & Gong,
2013; Phelps et al., 2016), and quadrature-based collocation
(Phelps et al., 2014; Walton, 2015; Walton et al., 2016). These
results rely on a variety of regularity assumptions on the
component functions, for which we refer the reader to the
references.
Here we apply the methods of Walton et al. (2016). We
consider a suitable approximation of parameter space to con-









i=1 ∈ R such that for continuous functions h(ω)
the following quadrature approximation of integration over









See Walton et al. (2016) for formal details. This discretiza-
tion of parameter space leads to the following approximate
problem:
Problem PM: Given probability density function φ : Ω →























dt (t) = f (z̄Mi (t), u(t), ωMi )
z̄Mi (0) = z0(ωMi ),
i = 1, . . . , M (26)
with initial condition x(0) = x0 and control constraint
g(u(t)) ≤ 0, ∀t ∈ [0, T ].
The approximate problem PM is a standard control prob-
lem, which can be addressed with a variety of established
methods. To implement the scenarios in this article, we utilize
the method of direct collocation (Gong et al., 2006; Ross &
Fahroo, 2003; Gong et al., 2016). This method creates a large
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finite-dimensional NLP problem, which can be solved using
a variety of available software packages (Gill et al., 2005;
Wächter & Biegler, 2006). As the problems are generally non-
convex, this method provides locally rather than necessarily
globally optimal solutions. Applications of the method, how-
ever, such as Walton et al. (2014) and Chung et al. (2011) and
the implementation in the next section, demonstrate that the
obtained stationary points are reasonable and informative.
3.1 Example
This example serves as an illustration of the potential for uti-
lizing this framework to optimize motion plans given complex
kinematic interactions between combative agents as well as
equipment-based damage rate functions. The agent dynamics
and damage rate functions provided for this simulation are not
yet calibrated by experimental data. However, they demon-
strate the ability to construct detailed optimization problems
built on specified capabilities and dynamics.
3.1.1 Problem overview
The following problem models a situation which can arise in
interception and asset protection challenges such as missile
defense. In this scenario, the goal is to optimally protect a
HVU from L incoming attackers. The HVU in this case is a
stationary unit, such as a base or population center. The attack-
ers are unmanned vehicles following automatic target tracking
toward the HVU while performing basic obstacle avoidance
around defenders, such as we might see with a guided missile
or small UAV attack. Attacker fire is directed entirely toward
the HVU with no fire to spare for self-defense. K defenders
are dispatched to protect the HVU at time t = 0. The single-
minded focus of the attacker means that the survival of the
defenders is not in danger, however their survival is not the
goal—the goal is to minimize the probability that the HVU is
destroyed. Figure 10 diagrams the attrition interactions.
F I G U R E 10 Interception of HVU-focused attack [Color figure can
be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
As automated systems, each attacker has deterministic
dynamics, with known algorithms due to intel. But we have
uncertain knowledge about their initial location. The initial
locations of the attackers are distributed in a ring around the
HVU with an average radius of 100 but with the exact ini-
tial location of each attacker an uncertain parameter ωl ∈ R2
with values uniformly distributed in balls of radius 10 around
this average radius. Together the distribution for the initial
locations for all attackers, ω = [ω1, . . . , ωL], has the joint
distribution φ(ω).
The conditional probability that the HVU survives until
time t based on initial attacker locations ω = [ω1, . . . , ωL] is
denoted by P0(t, ω). It is given in this scenario by the single-
shot kill probability (i.e., the value p0,k(t) in the multi-agent
case), given in Equation (14). This metric means that if the
attackers are able to get a single shot past defenses, the HVU
will be destroyed. The expected probability of destruction at






1 − P0(tf , ω)
]
φ(ω)dω (27)
and the goal of the scenario is to minimize this quantity given
the available control inputs for the K defenders.
The actions of the defenders in this scenario are able to
influence this final survival probability in two ways. The first
way is through their firing capabilities, as specified by their
damage rates. Their inflicted damages reduce attacker capabil-
ities, which in turn decreases damages incurred by the HVU.
The second way the defenders influence P0(t, ω) is through
their ability to “herd” the attackers away from the HVU. Herd-
ing takes advantage of kinematic predator–prey dynamics,
through which the attackers try to avoid the defenders. Herd-
ing strategies use this response beneficially to guide attackers
away from their target, increasing the probability of HVU
survival by influencing positions rather than applying force.
The specific defender controls and dynamics, defender
damage rates, attacker predator–prey dynamics, and attacker
damage rates are elaborated on in the following subsections.
This will be followed by a formal statement of the result-




The damage rate of the k-th defender against the l-th attacker
is given by:


































































12 WALTON ET AL.
where rk,l(t) is the magnitude of the distance between the k-th
defender and the l-th attacker as defined by Equation (22), Φ
is the cumulative distribution function for the normal distribu-
tion and λD, σD are constants that calibrate intensity and range.
The angle θk,l is the relative angle between the k-th defender





an element that degrades performance as this angle increases.
This results in smooth POV constraints for the defender capa-
bilities. In this example, we have not implemented the divided
effort factor proposed in Section 2.2, Equation (25) for dis-
tributing fire between multiple attackers. Fire power is limited
by the range constraint from σD, the POV constraint, and the
finite number of attackers. In this particular scenario, with
attackers so widely distributed that relatively few fall within
firing range at the same time, we feel this is does not have
a large impact. However, incorporating this factor may add
important realism to subsequent models.
Dynamics
Each of the K defenders are subject to control uk(t) ∈ R, with















⎠ = fk(xk(t), uk(t))
(29)
where vD is the constant defender velocity.
3.1.3 Attacker properties
Equipment
The damage rate of the l-th attacker against the HVU is given
by:





whereas with the defenders rl,0(t) is the magnitude of the dis-
tance between the l-th attacker and the HVU as defined by
Equation (22), Φ is the cumulative distribution function for
the normal distribution and λA, σA are constants that calibrate
intensity and range.
Dynamics
Each of the L attackers in this scenario are subject to reac-
tionary predator–prey dynamics, with attacker uncertainty
stemming from unknown initial positions. Attackers move
with constant velocity and a heading determined by a weighted
combination of their desire to evade each defender but also to
reach the HVU. These dynamics are expressed as:
.yl =












and Rl is the vector of relative positions between attacker




yl,1(t, ω) − xk,1(t)
yl,2(t, ω) − xk,2(t)
�
, (33)
Rl(t, ω) = �Rl,0(t, ω), Rl,1(t, ω), . . . , Rl,K(t, ω)� . (34)
The heading vector for each attacker is determined by aver-
aging the attacker’s conflicting impulses: on the one hand,
the attacker is endeavoring to “track” the HVU, and on the
other hand it is being “herded” away through avoidance of
the defenders.









�||Rl,k||� weights the influence of each agent based
on radial distance. Example averaging for one attacker avoid-
ing two defenders is shown in Figure 11. When k = 0,
αl,k
�||Rl,k||� returns a negative value attracting the attacker
to the HVU, and when k = 1, . . . , K , αl,k �||Rl,k||� returns a
positive value repelling the attacker from the defenders. These














σk , k = 1, . . . , K .
(36)
In the optimal control problem which follows, these
predator–prey dynamics will be referred to in summary as:
.yl(t, ω) = gl(x1(t), . . . , xK(t), yl(t, ω)). (37)
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F I G U R E 11 Averaged herding heading example for one attacker,
two defenders [Color figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
Optimal control problem
As per Equations (14) and (15) for the single-shot kill case, the
probability of survival of the l-th attacker is given by solving:
.
Ql(t, ω) = −Ql(t, ω)
K�
k=1
dk,lx (xk(t), yl(t, ω)) (38)
with Ql(0, ω) = 1, and the probability of survival of the HVU
is given by solving:
.
P0(t, ω) = −P0(t, ω)
L�
l=1
Ql(t, ω)dl,0y (yl(t, ω), x0) (39)
with P0(0, ω) = 1. Together with the dynamics proscribed
above this creates the following optimal control problem:
HVU Attack Interception: For K defenders and L attack-
ers with joint probability density function φ : Ω → R over













.xk(t) = fk(xk(t), uk(t)), xk(0) = xk0
umin ≤ uk(t) ≤ umax,





k=1 dk,lx (xk(t), yl(t, ω)), Ql(0, ω) = 1
.
P0(t, ω) =
−P0(t, ω) �Ll=1 Ql(t, ω)dl,0y (yl(t, ω), x0), P0(0, ω) = 1
for l = 1, . . . , L, k = 1 . . . , K .
3.1.4 Implementation
Scenario
The above scenario has been implemented for the values given
in Table 1. Initial defender positions are equi-distributed in a












Initial attacker positions are also equi-distributed, in a cir-
cle of radius 100, around the HVU, however this deployment
contains uncertainty in regards to their exact initial loca-
tion. Each attacker’s possible initial location is uniformly
T A B L E 1 Parameter values
Parameter Value Reference
HVU x0 [0, 0] HVU location
σ0 100 attraction coefficient,
Equation (36)
Defender K 1–7 number of defenders
vD 5 velocity, Equation (29)
umin −10π control bound, Equation (29)
umax 10π control bound, Equation (29)
λD 2 equipment intensity, Equation
(28)
σD 25 equipment range, Equation
(28)
σk 5 repelling coefficients,
Equation (36)
Attacker L 100 number of attackers
vA 5 velocity, Equation (31)
λA 1 equipment intensity, Equation
(30)
σA 15 equipment range, Equation
(30)
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T A B L E 2 Tabulation of number of decision variables
Defender Attacker Defender-on-Attacker Attacker-on-HVU Total number
variables variables damage rate variables damage rate variables of variables
20 time nodes L = 1 60 32 000 16 000 16 000 64 060
L = 7 420 32 000 112 000 16 000 160 420
100 time nodes L = 1 300 160 000 80 000 80 000 320 300
L = 7 2100 160 000 560 000 80 000 802 100
distributed in a circle of radius 10 around its mean position:








ω2l,1 + ω2l,2 < 10, φ(ωl) = 1100π
with the overall domain Ω and pdf φ(ω) given by the
crossproduct of the L attacker domains and pdfs respectively.
The final time of the scenario is set as tf = 100.
Algorithm
The discretized problem created by the computational frame-
work described previously was solved using the NLP software
lpopt (Wächter & Biegler, 2006). An alternate NLP solver
capable of handling the appropriate type of constraints and
high number of decision variables, such as snopt (Gill et al.,
2005), would also be appropriate. Default lpopt stopping tol-
erances were utilized. Per attacker, eight nodes were used
to discretize its parameter domain, in accordance with an 8-
point cubature scheme for 2D-discs. Independence of pdfs
and uncoupled dynamics allow for attacker effects to be con-
sidered in parallel, avoiding the exponential growth of the
cross product of the pdf. Results were examined for both 20
and 100 nodes in the time domain, for 100 attackers, and
for 1–7 deployed defenders. Resulting NLP problems thus
ranged in size from approximately 64 000 decision variables
(1 defender, 100 attackers, 20 time nodes, 8 parameter nodes)
to approximately 800 000 decision variables (7 defenders,
100 attackers, 100 time nodes, 8 parameter nodes). Table 2
provides the breakdown of this dimensional growth.
To optimize such a large problem, our numerical imple-
mentation was designed to take advantage of parallelism in
the computational design. Within the optimization routine, all
uncoupled ODEs were propagated in parallel. Specifically,
each defender’s dynamics, Equation (29), are independent
from each other, attacker’s dynamics can be independently
calculated for each value of ω, Equation (31), and the dynam-
ics of each attacker’s survival probabilities and the HVU
survival probability, Equations (38) and (39) are independent
with respect to ω. The parallel-focused implementation was
executed on a GPU (AMD HD7970) in order to take advantage
of lock stepping massively parallel execution mechanisms
F I G U R E 12 Execution time versus number of defenders, K
afforded by the hardware. The hardware architecture was Intel
i7–2600k CPU, 32 GByte Ram, AMD-7970 GPU.
3.1.5 Results
Figure 12 provides the execution times for 100 attackers, 1–7
defenders, and 20 and 100 times nodes, respectively. The
longest run time was under 10 hours for a 100-time node run
and 6 defenders, while all 20-time node runs were completed
in under 2 hours. For each value of the number of defend-
ers K, evaluating the problem at 100 nodes versus 20 nodes
takes more time. We should not, however, expect a mono-
tonic increase in execution times as the number of defenders
increases and the number of nodes N is kept constant. Solu-
tions for each K value are distinct with different local optima
that may be reached at different times by the NLP solver.
A performance comparison for each of these cases is given
in Figure 13. These survival probabilities were calculated
by re-propagating the ODEs through a more refined time
scale (1000 time nodes), and thus are not reflective of the
difference in quadrature accuracy for 20 versus 100 nodes.
Empirically, we can note that performance increases in this
case between 20 and 100 nodes is minimal, suggesting rapid
convergence of the underlying approximation scheme and
decreasing marginal benefits to increasing the node count. The
performance comparison in Figure 13 also shows the even-
tual decreasing marginal benefits with added defenders. We
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F I G U R E 13 Survival probability versus number of defenders, K
see that as HVU survival probability nears 1, the addition of
more defenders yields little improvement.
Figures 14 and 15 show snapshots of the solution calcu-
lated for 2 and 7 defenders respectively, using 100 time nodes.
These snapshots combine several features of the attackers. To
portray the uncertainty, for each attacker 128 initial location
instances have been sampled from the distribution of uncer-
tain initial locations. This results in 12 800 possible attacker
trajectories drawn. For each time range in the snapshot, the
trajectory over that time range is rendered. Finally, the prob-
ability of survival of an attacker over possible trajectory is
rendered through marker size—attackers begin drawn with
marker size 1 (probability of survival 1), and are subsequently
drawn with marker size equal to their probability of survival
at the time rendered. When probability of survival is near zero
for a sampled attacker instance, it becomes not visible in the
snapshot.
The solutions demonstrate the effects of the two modes
of influence: damaging fire and herding. On the one hand,
attacker survival probabilities are diminished through the
continuous application of damaging fire. On the other hand,
possible attacker locations are pushed into smaller and smaller
regions of uncertainty, neutralizing any attacker’s ability to
near the HVU. The ability to model impact projections for
both of these modalities increases opportunities for assessing
tradeoffs of violent versus nonviolent force. In the scenario
of Figure 14, we see a poor survival probability for the HVU,
with surviving attackers unable to be rebuffed from contact
with the HVU. Attackers still have dangerously high survival
probabilities by the end of the scenario, and have made it close
to the HVU. Defenders in the meantime are unable to utilize
their mobility; without enough of them to establish a wide
perimeter, they are forced to remain close to the HVU. Fig-
ure 15 in contrast displays a scenario with high probability of
HVU survival. By the last time frame of Figure 15, attackers
are invisible (i.e., negligible survival probabilities) and before
their destruction, they have been kept at a larger distance from
the HVU. Defenders are able to both rebuff the attackers out-
ward away from the HVU and utilize sideways motions to
“sweep” possible attacker locations into smaller regions. The
performance comparison in Figure 13 shows the increasing
effectiveness of more defenders. With refined calibration of
equipment and dynamic models, these comparisons can be
used to benefit asset allocation decisions.
The computational methods used provide local optimal
rather than necessarily globally optimal solutions, and both
scenario results illustrate intervals which suggest nonunique
local optima. In Figure 14, defenders cover very little ground,
moving instead in tight orbits near the central HVU. When
the attackers are still out of range of much defender influ-
ence, it is doubtful these orbits are uniquely optimal. In Figure
15 this effect is more visible. In the beginning of the sce-
nario, the defenders bide their time before heading out toward
the approaching ring of attackers. If they head out too early,
when the ring is larger, the defenders will get spread too thin
and attackers can escape between them. Delaying intercep-
tion until the periphery is small enough to blockade prevents
this danger. While the delay is critical, there are likely many
locally optimal ways to accomplish this delay. This explains
the unconventional trajectories at the very beginning of the
scenario, and also at the end of the scenario when the 7
defenders have already eliminated the danger.
4 D I S C U S S I O N
4.1 Context
The models described in this article provide global trajectory
plans and projections of performance given current informa-
tion. As an open-loop framework, the computational methods
in this article are just one piece of a larger strategic tool-
box needed for real-time encounters. Ultimately in real-time
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F I G U R E 14 Snapshots from 2 defenders solution. Size of attacker icon decreases with their probability of survival [Color figure can be viewed
at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
encounters, to be useful any tool will have to inform respon-
sive strategies capable of incorporating feedback and evolving
with changing knowledge and conditions. The possibilities
demonstrated in this article do not execute this final strate-
gic stage of real-time response. They are, rather, proposed
as a beginning step. We think they provide a launch pad for
multiple different directions of development.
The parameter-based approach to uncertainty in Section
3 is a natural format for incorporating information updates.
Bayesian update rules can be used to refine the param-
eter distribution, resulting in an updated optimal control
problem in the same format. These update rules depend
specifically on which problem feature is being observed.
Observation of a successful hit, observation of unsuccessful
fire, observation of attacker location, and observations
ruling out certain attacker locations all result in different rules.
For continuous time problems with rapid-acting equipment,
in addition to which feature is being observed, we also have
the possibility of either continuous time observations (for
instance, a continuous observation over some time period
[t1, t2] that the target is not where you are looking) or dis-
crete event observations (for instance, the observation that a
target at a specified position has been hit). For an example of
update rules for both discrete and continuous cases for a con-
trol problem within the framework of this article, we refer the
reader to Walton, Kragelund, and Kaminer (2017). As Walton
et al. (2017) shows, these update rules can be derived mechan-
ically from an application of Bayes rule. However, due to the
length of derivation we refer the reader to the reference for an
example rather than including one in this article.
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F I G U R E 15 Snapshots from 7 defenders solution. Size of attacker icon decreases with their probability of survival [Color figure can be viewed
at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
The current challenge in incorporating information
updates in implementation is the construction of a functional
update cycle. As can be seen by Figure 12, computation
times for the example in this article are still on the order
of hours. This is too slow for most scenarios if the strat-
egy is simply to re-compute plans after information update.
One option may to be to utilize these trajectories which aver-
age over the risk created by the parameter uncertainty as the
initial seed trajectory in a two-stage strategy. Defenders can
begin on this trajectory and collect several observations. These
observations can be used to remove the parameter uncer-
tainty from the problem (reduce the uncertainty to negligible
levels). We note that there is no requirement for the attri-
tion models of Section 2 to be attached to the parameter
uncertainty of Section 3. Without uncertainty, the attrition
metrics can still be used to construct a nonlinear, relatively
high dimension optimal control problem—but with dimen-
sion an order of magnitude smaller due to the lack of additional
parameter space. This order of magnitude reduction reduces
computation time to minutes or less. While not real-time yet,
from minutes to seconds is an achievable computational gap
to cross soon, for example by using more efficient software
and/or hardware implementations. One can imagine this two-
stage strategy being effective in the scenarios of Figures 14
and 15. Initial intel estimates some number of attackers arriv-
ing from any direction around them. The number of defenders,
their firepower, and the averaged risk directs them to what size
of periphery to establish. While they are establishing this, the





















































18 WALTON ET AL.
attackers draw closer. Once closer, their true positions become
apparent and plans can be updated with more specificity.
In addition to informing real-time feedback policies, a tool
for optimizing given all a priori information can fill valuable
roles in analysis. It can be used to provide benchmarks with
which to gauge the performance of faster, sub-optimal heuris-
tic algorithms. For instance, we could use these methods to
asses deployment patterns for our own automated UAVs. A
small UAV seeking an uncertain target in a region might,
in implementation, have to use algorithms as simple at the
attacker algorithms in the example of Section 3.1. When engi-
neering those algorithms, however, tools such as this can be
used to benchmark performance against an ideal best case.
These methods can also be a tool for pre-determining asset
allocation. Figure 13 provides an example of how this can be
used beforehand for cost-benefit analysis of number of units
deployed. And, of course, there are some cases where either
updated information is not an option or pre-established plans
are required, in which case global plans optimized with regard
to equipment capabilities and expected risk are beneficial.
4.2 Other applications
Although derived for combat modeling, this framework can
also describe many situations in which (a) there is continu-
ous or nearly continuous equipment activity, and (b) there is
environmental uncertainty which can be expressed as param-
eters. For instance, the section on damage rates mentions
the optimal search problem and the modeling of sonar and
radar performance using rate functions and the exponential
detection function. What this classic model does not consider,
however, is the possibility of false detection. The exponential
detection model quantifies the probability of at least a single
detection event, assumed to be real. This is, in the terminology
of this article, a requirement on the zero-th order hit–akin to
assuming single shot kill. It may be, however, that due to the
possibility of error, a certain fidelity is preferable. The proba-
bility of receiving at least n pings on a target, may be a more
reliable metric for instance. By utilizing the quantities pro-
vided in Equations (15) and (18), we can extend the classic
optimal search problem to include these considerations. Simi-
larly, some mapping projects which rely on nearly continuous
but probabilistic sensor input may track the expected fidelity
of their input using these quantities.
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